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conclude that in the next years, it will become an integral part of  the boardroom. This paper 
examines how AI can be used to augment the decision-making process of  the board of  directors and 
the possible legal implications regarding its deployment in the field of  company law and corporate 
governance. After examining the three possible stages of  AI use in the boardroom, based on a 
multidisciplinary approach, the advantages and pitfalls of  using AI in the decision-making process 
are scrutinised. Moreover, AI might be able to autonomously manage a company in the future, 
whether the legal appointment of  the AI as a director is possible and the enforceability of  its 
action is tested. Concomitantly, a change in the corporate governance paradigm is proposed for 
Smart Companies. Finally, following a comparative analysis on company and securities law, possible 
adaptations to the current directors’ liability scheme when AI is used to augment the decisions of  the 
board is investigated and future legal solutions are proposed for the legislator.
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1. Introduction
After the Industrial Revolution, innovation has been one of  the main drives of  
the economy. General purpose technologies, starting from the steam engine, electricity, 
and the internal combustion engine to computers, shaped the economy and society. 
One of  the most important general-purpose technologies of  our era is artificial 
intelligence (hereinafter, “AI”) and machine learning, and it is expected to disrupt the 
current business models in the coming  years.1   
Algorithm-driven companies2 have managed over the years to maintain their 
market position, disrupt traditional industries, and create new business models.3 At 
the same time, firms outside the tech industry have been exploiting the potential of  
smart algorithms in an effort to reinvent themselves and maintain their competitive 
advantage,4 suggesting that the use of  AI is organisationally important for the success 
and relevance of  a company. Specifically, incorporating AI throughout the value chain 
can provide real-time market information and analysis shaping R&D strategies and the 
delivery of  products and services in a direct, fast, and inexpensive manner.5
Furthermore, more and more studies estimate that the time when AI will enter the 
boardroom is not far.6 This is already feasible to some extent, since, although AI is still at 
1 Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, “The business of  Artificial Intelligence what it can — and 
cannot — do for your organization”, Harvard Business Review, July 27, 2017, accessed April 2, 2020, 
https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-business-of-artificial-intelligence. 
2 The term algorithmic business was first used by Gartner in 2015, initially, to refer to digital business, 
and it is defined as “... the industrialized use of  complex mathematical algorithms pivotal to driving improved business 
decisions or process automation for competitive differentiation”, “Gartner Glossary: Algorithmic Biases”, Gartner, 
accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/algorithmic-business/. Similarly, Professor 
Ezrachi and Professor Stucke refer to algorithm-driven companies to describe businesses that deploy Big 
Data, Big Analytics, algorithms and AI to determine products and set prices. Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. 
Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of  the Algorithm-Driven Economy, (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2016). Steve Mezak, “How to Succeed with a Platform Business Model”, Forbes, June 
22, 2016, accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2016/06/22/how-
to-succeed-with-a-platform-business-model/#3f62855c405b.
3 Scott Galloway, “How Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google Manipulate our Emotions”, 
TEDNYC, October 2017, accessed April 2, 2020 https://www.ted.com/talks/scott_galloway_how_
amazon_apple_facebook_and_google_manipulate_our_emotions?language=en, Barry Libert, Yoram 
(Jerry) Wind and Megan Beck, “What Airbnb, Uber, and Alibaba Have in Common”, Harvard Business 
Review, November 20, 2014,  accessed April 2, 2020, https://hbr.org/2014/11/what-airbnb-uber-
and-alibaba-have-in-common, and Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, Machine, Platform, Crowd: 
Harnessing Our Digital Future (New York and London: WW Norton & Company, 2017), 138-155. 
4 For instance, Coca-Cola, in 2017, used AI analysis of  data collected from self-service soda fountains 
to determine its future product development Bernard Marr, “The Amazing Ways Coca Cola Uses 
Artificial Intelligence And Big Data To Drive Success”, Forbes, September 18, 2017, accessed April 2, 
2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/09/18/the-amazing-ways-coca-cola-uses-
artificial-intelligence-ai-and-big-data-to-drive-success/#6fb5ff8e78d2.
5 “Leading In A Disruptive World: How Companies Are Reinventing Themselves”, McKinsey & 




6 See, for instance report of  the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on the Future of  
Software and Society, “Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and Societal Impact”,  September 2015, 
accessed April 2, 2020, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC15_Technological_Tipping_
Points_report_2015.pdf, where nearly half  of  the respondents expect that artificial intelligence (AI) 
will become part of  companies’ board of  directors by 2025, and Dell Technologies Report, “Realizing 
2030: A Divided Vision of  the Future”, accessed April 2, 2020 https://www.delltechnologies.com/
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its infancy, it progresses at a fast pace. Soon, AI will be able to make optimal managerial 
decisions, faster and at a lower predictions cost, by minimising the uncertainties7. By 
letting AI in the boardroom, tedious and time-consuming administrative tasks, like 
monitoring and reporting, will be off  the managers’ hands, allowing them to focus 
on more important business aspects, such as the company’s future strategy, thus, 
increasing productivity. Specifically, it is estimated that labour productivity, including 
the productivity of  the board of  directors, will increase by 55 per cent due to the use 
of  AI, between 2017 until 2030.8 As for more complex business decisions, for instance 
whether a merger or an investment should take place, AI, based on predictive analytics, 
can instantly analyse a bundle of  data, creating new information and may ultimately 
suggest the optimal decision, while considering the relevant regulation.9 Furthermore, 
AI can work on a precautionary manner, as it can provide real-time information and 
assess even minor anomalies in the company. From an economic theory perspective, 
AI can lower the prediction costs, allowing more judgments and ultimately facilitating 
the final decisions of  the board.10 In other words, AI will  enhance the decision-making 
process of  the board of  directors.11
In  light of  the above, two scenarios can occur when AI is used in the boardroom 
to augment the decisions made by the directors.12 In the first scenario, the AI aids the 
board of  directors by making suggestions regarding the management and business 
strategy of  the company. For its suggestions, the AI considers all the relevant data. 
However, although the board may rely upon the AI’s suggestions, it is the one making 
the final decision, after reviewing separately the available information or, in general, the 
fairness and lawfulness of  the AI’s decision. 
In the second scenario, as in the first scenario the AI makes decisions, the board 
of  directors should follow the suggestion made by the AI. This can happen unofficially, 
because the company has put its trust in  the optimality of  the decisions made by the 
en-us/perspectives/realizing-2030.htm#, where 96 per cent of  the respondents answered positively 
on whether companies will automate through AI many of  their tasks, many of  which were falling in 
the managerial and administrative scope.
7 Roger Trapp, “How Can AI Help Leaders Make Better Decisions”, Forbes, June 14, 2018, accessed 
April 2, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogertrapp/2018/06/14/how-ai-can-help-leaders-
make-better-decisions/#7d2eae725e2f. 
8 Vegard Kolbjørnsrud, Richard Amico and Robert J. Thomas, “The Promise of  Artificial intelligence: 
Redefining Management in the Workforce of  the Future”, Accenture Institute for High Performance, 
2017, accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.accenture.com/nl-en/insight-promise-artificial-intelligence.
9 “Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Financial Services: Market Developments and 
Financial Stability Implications”, Financial Stability Board, November 1, 2017, accessed April 2, 2020, 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P011117.pdf. 
10 Ajay Agrawal , Joshua Gans and Avi Goldfarb, “The Simple Economics of  Machine Intelligence”, 
Harvard Business Review, November 17, 2016, accessed April 3, 2020, https://hbr.org/2016/11/the-
simple-economics-of-machine-intelligence. 
11 Barry Libert, Megan Beck and Mark Bonchek, “AI in the Boardroom: The Next Realm of  
Corporate Governance”, MIT Sloan Management Review, October 19, 2017, accessed April 3, 2020, 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/ai-in-the-boardroom-the-next-realm-of-corporate-governance/. 
12 Similarly, see the hypotheses regarding whether an AI can be a trustee introduced in an essay 
by Professor Lawrence B. Solum, in 1992. Lawrence B. Solum, “Legal Personhood for Artificial 
Intelligences”, N.C. L. Rev., vol 70, No. 4 (1992): 1241-1242, https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/
vol70/iss4/4, and Maria Jesus Saenz, Elena Revilla and Cristina Simón, “Designing AI Systems With 
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AI or because the nature of  the decisions demands a rapid response and the analysis of  
a significant amount of  data. Progressively, this reliance on the decisions of  the AI can 
come on a more official manner, when such an instruction is included in the articles 
of  association or in a shareholders’ agreement. The reasons for this might be the trust 
of  the shareholders to the consistency and accuracy of  the decisions made by the 
algorithm or the recognition of  its use as standard business practice. In this case, again 
the board is the one making the final decision, but the AI’s decision coincides with the 
final one. Theoretically, at this stage the board does not have to check the lawfulness 
of  the decision, as long as it appears to be the correct one and it follows it in good 
faith. However, it may have to continue checking the fairness of  the AI’s decision. It 
should be noted, nonetheless, that at this stage, the human factor is still not eliminated. 
The board will be able to deviate from the decision of  the AI if  it recognises that the 
decision of  the AI is for some reason faulty; for instance, because of  a malfunction, or 
because it is unfair.
These two hypotheses will be used to examine the possible adaptation of  the 
current accountability mechanisms for smart companies; companies using AI in the 
decision-making process of  the board of  directors. The regulatory recommendations 
proposed below are in accordance with the principle-based approach that seems to be 
followed by the Commission in  relation to AI.13
Nonetheless, as AI evolves, a third stage of  AI involvement in the business 
decision-making process can emerge. It is possible that in the future, AI will be able 
to autonomously run a company on its own, without any human intervention.14 The 
current legal framework, as it will be discussed briefly in Section 4.1, does not allow 
an AI to be appointed in the board of  directors and subsequently to make managerial 
decisions for the company. Nonetheless, this legal barrier does not discourage academics 
from discussing the possibility of  companies being owned and run by an AI, making 
relevant the discussion of  whether automated actions carried out by the AI can be 
enforceable.15 However, while scholars highlight the future need of  company law and 
corporate governance to adapt their standards and accountability mechanisms when 
AI is used in the decision-making process, the way to do so has not been yet explored.16 
At the same time, AI researchers are exploring the potential of  the combination of  
AI and blockchain technology, to create a new type of  organisation, an AI Decentralised 
13 See for instance, European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Report on the safety 
and liability implications of  Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of  Things and robotics, 19 February 
2020, COM(2020) 64 final, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/commission-report-safety-and-
liability-implications-ai-internet-things-and-robotics-0_en, where clarifications and adaptations of  the 
current legal framework are proposed. 
14 Artur Kiulian, “Decentralized Artificial Intelligence Is Coming: Here’s What You Need 
To Know”, Forbes, January 11, 2018, accessed April 3, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbestechcouncil/2018/01/11/decentralized-artificial-intelligence-is-coming-heres-what-you-need-
to-know/#a7afe43146dc. 
15 Shawn J Bayern, Thomas Burri, Thomas D.Grant, Daniel Markus Häusermann, Florian Möslein, 
and Richard Williams, “Company Law and Autonomous Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers, 
Entrepreneurs, and Regulators”, Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal, vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 
2017), 135-162, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850514 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2850514, 
and Shawn J. Bayern, “The Implications of  Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of  
Autonomous Systems”, Stanford Technology Law Review, vol. 19 (2015).
16 Möslein Florian, “Robots in the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence and Corporate Law” in Research 
Handbook on the Law of  Artificial Intelligence, ed. Woodrow Barfield and Ugo Pagallo, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2018), https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786439055. 
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Autonomous Organisation (hereinafter, “DAO”).17 The decentralised infrastructure of  
a DAO, and the resources offered by blockchain technology, together with AI to make 
the decisions for the token holders, in its simplest form, will first ensure the necessary 
quorum. On a more complex level, the AI DAO could be the one managing the funds 
of  the organisation and deciding their distribution, hence creating, and executing smart 
contracts. For instance, the AI after analysing data regarding consumer preferences and 
market trends, will be able to decide and subsequently release and distribute funds for 
advertising or for the company’s next R&D project.18 
2. Behavioural economics & directors’ decisions
One of  the biggest arguments against AI is the unpredictability of  its decisions.19 
However, in the widely praised book Homo Deus, writer Yuvan Noah Harari explains 
that human decisions, are also utterly random; “a combination of  predetermined biochemical 
events and subatomic accidents”.20 Similarly, modern behavioral economics agree that 
humans do not behave according to the model of  perfect rationality of  the game and 
agency theory or that of  the Econ.21 Contrary to the rationality of  the acting agent 
advocated by the expected utility theory, humans are irrational when they make risky 
decisions; decisions with uncertain outcomes. The uncertainty of  outcome is intrinsic 
in every choice made, even the ostensibly certain ones.22
According to prospect theory,23 applicable to the decisions made by the board of  
directors, the way the possibility of  losses and gains, as outcomes of  the decisions, is 
perceived is biased, since firstly, it depends heavily on the company’s financial status 
quo or goals. Secondly, when there is no possibility of  loss, directors will be prone to 
a risk aversion decision. On the contrary, however, when there is a possibility of  loss, 
the directors tend to follow the riskier business decisions to avoid even the smallest 
certain loss.24 In other words, the directors will be more focused on avoiding losses 
than achieving gains. 
However, the board of  directors, as a collective decision-making body, is 
considered able to tackle the problem of  bounded rationality.25 The collection and 
storage of  information, based on the diverse expertise and experience of  the boards is 
more effective, and with a well-structured governance, the costs of  communication and 
manipulation of  the information can be minimised. Nonetheless, from a behavioral 
perspective, the idea that the board of  directors as a corporate governance mechanism, 
is able to circumvent the pitfalls of  bounded rationality,26 does not take into account 
17 Trent McConaghy, “AI DAOs, and Three Paths to Get There”, Medium, June 18, 2016, accessed 
April 3, 2020, https://blog.bigchaindb.com/ai-daos-and-three-paths-to-get-there-cfa0a4cc37b8. 
18 Ibid and supra note 14. 
19 Will Knight, “The Dark Secret at the Heart of  AI”, MIT Technology Review, April 11, 2017, accessed 
April 3, 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/. 
20 Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief  History of  Tomorrow (New York, NY: Harper, 2016), 228-235. 
21 Richard H. Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of  Behavioral Economics (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2015).
22 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking fast and slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 216. 
23 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect theory: an analysis of  decision under risk”, 
Econometrica, vol. 47, No. 2 (March, 1979): 263-292.
24 Ibid, 288, where the writers state that “losses to loom larger than gains”. 
25 Roy Radner, “Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of  the Firm”, Econ. J, vol. 106, 
No. 438 (Sep., 1996): 1360, 1363.
26 Stephen M. Bainbridge, “The Board of  Directors”, in The Oxford Handbook of  Corporate Law and 
Governance, ed. Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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the special conditions that develop in the boardroom, such as power relationships and 
individual preferences, which may ultimately affect the directors’ decisions.27
Furthermore, humans are by nature, inconsistent in the way they make decisions 
that have uncertain outcomes. Irrelevant factors such as their current mood, health 
state or even the weather, affect their decisions.28 At the same time, humans tend 
to be biased on a general, social or cognitive level. For instance, executives, can be 
overoptimistic or overconfident or, even so, their decisions might be a product of  an 
anchor effect.29 The variability of  the decisions is, of  course, limited when strict rules 
apply.30 However, that is not the case when it comes to board of  directors. Executives 
are free to make decisions, formed merely by company guidelines, business practices, 
personal experience, and by general law principles. Thus, the decisions made by 
executives may differ from decisions made by their peers regarding similar subjects 
and with the same information given, or even, from their own previous decisions. This 
opinion follows the principle of  satisfying behaviour, as a behavioural-theory aspect of  
corporate governance. According to the idea of  satisfying behaviour, boards only make 
satisfactory decisions based on immediate problems that arise.31 The weakness of  this 
decision-making process appears when the short-term company’s goals cannot be met. 
Additionally, although more visible in big business deals, these inconsistent judgment 
calls, even the minor ones, can lead to a loss of  a profit when viewed on an annual basis. 
On the contrary, AI is, by definition, more consistent. In other words, even the 
simplest algorithm, provided the same information, will reach the same result, at any 
given time. As it has been showcased in different studies already since the 1980s, simple 
statistical algorithms were 10 per cent more accurate and consistent in their decisions 
than professionals.32 Consistency, along with AI’s ability to diagnose and analyse a large 
amount of  data quickly, allows AI to make decisions that require a significant amount 
of  time and due diligence by the board. Of  course, this alone does not mean that the 
system will be error-free. Three types of  pitfalls and inherent limitations of  AI have 
been identified.33 First, since the data given to the AI are by definition biased, for 
instance based on previous, even faulty, decisions made by the board of  directors, this 
27 Catherine M. Daily, Dan R. Dalton and Albert A. Cannella Jr., “Corporate Governance: Decades 
of  Dialogue and Data”, The Academy of  Management Review, vol. 28, No. 3 (July, 2003): 373, DOI: 
10.2307/30040727. 
28 Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav, and Liora Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous factors in judicial decisions”, 
PNAS, vol. 108, issue 17 (April, 2011): 6889-6892, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1018033108. Where 
it was found that judge’s parole decisions were more favourable up to 65 per cent after a lunch break. 
29“Anchoring is a behavioral bias in which the use of  a psychological benchmark, rule-of-thumb or heuristic carries a 
disproportionately high weight in a market participant’s decision-making process”, definition from Investopedia, 
accessed April 3, 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/anchoring.asp. See also Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science”, New 
Series, vol. 185, issue 4157 (1974): 1124-1131. 
30 Daniel Kahneman, Andrew M. Rosenfield, Linnea Gandhi and Tom Blaser, “Noise: How to Overcome 
the High, Hidden Cost of  Inconsistent Decision Making”, Harvard Business Review, October Issue 2016, 
https://hbr.org/2016/10/noise where the writers call this “chance variability of  judgments noise”. 
31 John Hendry, “Beyond self-interest: Agency theory and the Board in a Satisficing World”, British 
Journal of  Management, vol. 16, Special issue (2005), 55-63, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00447.x. 
32 William M. Grove, David H. Zald, Boyd S. Lebow, Beth E. Snitz and Chad Nelson, “Clinical versus 
mechanical prediction: a meta-analysis”, Psychological Assessment, vol. 12, No. 1 (2000): 19-30, with 
references to relevant studies. And Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust and Paul E. Meehl, “Clinical versus 
actuarial judgment”, Science, vol. 243, No. 4899 (Mar. 1989):1668-74.
33 Supra note 2.
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will affect or somehow tarnish the decision itself.34 Secondly, deep neural networks 
have millions of  connections which, combined, form the decision made by the AI, 
but it is impossible to trace it back.35 At the same time, the statistical based truths 
on which the system runs, make it particularly difficult to verify whether it functions 
properly.36 Thirdly, and closely connected with the previous drawbacks, detecting, and 
concomitantly, correcting possible errors of  the system will prove to be a difficult task.37 
In other words, although imperfect, AI can make optimal decisions, in other words, it 
can provide the best alternative in  a given situation. Optimal decisions, in conjunction 
with consistency, prove to be useful tools for companies and their boards.38 
Notwithstanding, the intuitive intelligence of  the directors in making judgments 
remains paramount for the company, as it encompass the directors’ imagination, 
creativity and experiences.39 It is the element that makes the directors adaptable to new 
unpredictable and equivocal situations, such as taking into account and balancing the 
interests of  different stakeholders, an area in which the AI may be lacking.40 As it was 
concisely asserted in an article written by Professor Eric Brynjolfsson and research 
scientist Andrew McAfee, “over the next decade, AI won’t replace managers, but managers who 
use AI will replace those who don’t”.41  In other words, the analytical and intuitive processes 
of  the directors are essential for the company but when the aim is an optimal decision, 
they are not enough42. However, as will be discussed in Section 3.2, this new level of  
information and insight provided to the directors requires redefining their role, the 
standards of  care, and potentially, their liability.43
3. Smart companies
3.1. Data strategy and governance recommendations 
Integrating AI within the business structure and throughout the value chain 
requires prior development and deployment of  sufficient strategies and governance 
models. 
Firstly, companies wishing to use AI in the boardroom should put in place an 
adequate data strategy. Sufficient data, historical and operational, about the company 
and the board’s decisions, the relevant market and the current regulations should be 
34 Will Knight, “Biased Algorithms Are Everywhere, and No One Seems to Care”, MIT Technology 
Review, July 12, 2017 , accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608248/biased-
algorithms-are-everywhere-and-no-one-seems-to-care/, and Stephen Buranyi, “Rise Of  The Racist 
Robots – How AI Is Learning All Our Worst Impulses”, The Guardian, August 8, 2017, accessed April 
4, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/aug/08/rise-of-the-racist-robots-how-ai-is-
learning-all-our-worst-impulses. 




39 As mentioned by Carl Jung, intuitive intelligence, as an irrational function is the human ability of  
processing information deeply and based on sensation and perception. See C.G. Jung, “Psychological 
Types”, Bollingen Series XX, Volume 6 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971).
40 Mohammad Hossein Jarrahi, “Artificial intelligence and the future of  work: Human-AI symbiosis in 
organizational decision making” Business Horizons Elsevier, vol. 61, No. 4 (2018): 577-586, 580. 
41 Supra note 2. 
42 Roger L. Martin, The design of  business: Why design thinking is the next competitive advantage (Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business Press, 2009), 9. 
43 David Lancefield and Carlo Gagliardi, “Reimagining the Boardroom for an Age of  Virtual Reality 
and AI”, Harvard Business Review, April 03, 2015, accessed March 20, 2020, https://hbr.org/2015/04/
reimagining-the-boardroom-for-an-age-of-virtual-reality-and-ai. 
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collected, “cleansed”,44 and should be ready to use. This step is intrinsic since this data 
will be the basis of  the AI’s learning and will subsequently affect its decisions.45 At 
the same time, the algorithm itself  should be clearly developed. The objectives of  
the AI should be identified, and their importance should be quantified.46 Additionally, 
negative side effects in the environment where AI is functioning should be foreseen 
and avoided. When AI is launched, it will be able to autonomously access and analyse 
available data.47 Thus, it is necessary that techno-regulation measures are put in place 
to limit the data that the AI can collect.48 For instance, by hardcoding legal safeguards 
in the algorithm, compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (hereinafter, “GDPR”) 
can be ensured, while at the same time, in case the AI has been licensed and it is used 
by two competitors, the AI can be prohibited from using data of  one competitor to 
make decisions for the company. Especially for managerial decisions, a balance should 
be struck between short-term profits and the company’s sustainability. AI as a human 
creation, is prone to error and subject to the will of  its creator.49 Thus, the goals and 
the decisions made by the AI should comply with the rules set by business norms, 
corporate governance and company law, and this can be ascertained through the 
principles of  disclosure and transparency, already existing in corporate governance. 
In accordance with the corporate governance principles, a company should 
disclose material information, in a sufficient and comprehensive manner. Based on 
that principle, besides financial information and commercial objectives, companies are 
encouraged to voluntarily disclose information regarding the company policies and the 
board of  directors. Since the AI will be used in the decision-making process of  the 
board and concomitantly the suggestion made by the AI may be followed and finalised 
by the board of  directors, it can be argued that the use of  AI in the boardroom consists 
of   material information, and thus, the company should inform the stakeholders that it 
is using an AI to augment the decisions of  its board. 
Secondly, regarding the goals of  the AI, a scheme similar to the transparency 
principle embedded in the GDPR,50 specifically in Recitals 39 and 42, regarding the 
purposes of  data processing can apply. Specifically, the company should clearly present 
the goals entrenched in the AI, and their legal basis in a transparent and sufficient 
manner, of  course, without compromising the company’s competitive position. By 
44 “Data cleansing or data cleaning or data scrubbing is the process of  altering data in a given storage 
resource to make sure that it is accurate and correct” definition from Technopedia, accessed March 
26, 2020, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1174/data-cleansing. 
45 Alon Halevy, Peter Norvig, and Fernando Pereira, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of  
Data. Intelligent Systems”, IEEE, March-April, 2009, accessed March 20, 2020, https://static.
googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/35179.pdf. 
46 Similarly see Matthew U. Scherer, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, And Strategies”, Harvard Journal of  Law & Technology, vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring 2016): 367, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2609777. 
47 Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future (New 
York and London: WW Norton & Company, 2018), 138-155. 
48 Tiago Sérgio Cabral, AI Regulation in the European Union: Democratic Trends, Current Instruments and 
Future Initiatives (Master’s thesis, University of  Minho, 2019), 215-220.
49 Elon Musk, in Werner Herzog’s documentary Lo and Behold: Reveries of  the Connected World, very 
graphically says “if  you were a hedge fund or a private equity fund and you said, all I want my AI to do is maximize 
the value of  my portfolio, then the AI could decide, the best way to do that is to short consumer stocks, go long defense 
stocks and start a war”.
50 Tiago Sérgio Cabral, AI Regulation in the European Union, 255-285; Tiago Sérgio Cabral, “Robotics 
and AI in the European Union: opportunities and challenges”, UNIO – EU Law Journal, vol. 4, No. 
2 (2018): 135-146.
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making public the goals of  the AI, first the company’s compliance with the set company 
and governance rules is ascertained, while the stakeholders are informed about the 
nature of  the situations and the type of  decisions where AI will be used. 
Thus, instead of  what has been argued in academia, 51 the source code of  the AI 
and its value as an intangible asset; as an intellectual property right or as a trade secret, 
will remain undisclosed. At the same time, the proposed scheme takes into account 
the features of  machine learning.52 Specifically, one of  the reasons why the technology 
is efficient is because of  its deep learning networks, with millions of  connections. 
This complex structure concomitantly formatting the decision of  the AI, makes it 
impractical, even impossible, to trace back, explain, or test following a black-box logic,53 
the algorithmic decision.54  
Thirdly, the company concisely and efficiently should outline the measures 
that it takes to ensure the proper function of  the AI and subsequently protect the 
stakeholders. For this scheme, §80 (2) of  the German Wertpapierhandelsgesetz 
(hereinafter “WpHG”), regarding algorithm-based trading by securities companies, can 
be used. In particular, the company should put in place risk-averse mechanisms that 
will further ascertain that the AI is resilient, that causing damage to the stakeholders 
due to a system malfunctions can be avoided, and, finally, that the purpose of  the use 
of  the AI is in compliance with the current European and national laws.
For instance, a software verification process can be used to verify that the AI is 
functioning properly when it makes a decision.55 This technique is already used in 
the field of  aviation, which can facilitate the transparency scheme and strengthen the 
stakeholders’ trust to the company deploying the AI in the decision-making process.56 
In total, the transparency regime described above, will be beneficial for the 
company. Due to the benefits coming from the use of  AI in the boardroom, as well as, 
the excitement surrounding the technology, the company can attract new capital and, 
especially through the security mechanisms, gain trust from the market. 
51 Supra note 46, 397. 
52 Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. 
Robinson and Harlan Yu, “Accountable Algorithms”, U. Pa. L. Rev., vol. 165, issue 633 (2017), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol165/iss3/3, 660, where the writers describe 
why disclosing the source code is not a suitable solution for machine learning AI. 
53 According to this process, AI is seen as a black box, which although the process followed within 
it cannot be traced, the correctness of  the decisions can be tested by examining the inputs. This 
verification process, called auditing, in computer science, means “an independent evaluation of  conformance 
of  software products and processes to applicable regulations, standards, guidelines, plans, specifications, and procedures”. 
IEEE “Standard for Software Reviews and Audits,” in IEEE Std 1028-2008, 1-53, August 15, 2008, https://
doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2008.4601584. Also see, ibid, 660-661. 
54 Towards this direction, regarding GDPR, see supra note 50, 656. See, Tiago Sérgio Cabral, AI 
Regulation in the European Union, 29-30; Francisco Pacheco de Andrade and Tiago Sérgio Cabral, 
“Regulating liability for AI within the EU: Short introductory considerations”, UNIO EU Law Journal. 
The Official Blog – Thinking and Debating Europe, accessed March 3, 2020, https://officialblogofunio.
com/2019/10/25/regulating-liability-for-ai-within-the-eu-short-introductory-considerations/. 
55 Supra note 50, 662. where software verification is described as “… a set of  techniques for proving 
mathematically that software has certain properties, either by analyzing existing code or by building software using 
specialized tools for extracting proved correct invariants”.
56 Jean Souyris, Virginie Wiels, David Delmas, Hervé Delseny, “Formal Verification of  Avionics 
Software Products”, in FM 2009: Formal Methods. FM 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ed. Ana 
Cavalcanti, Dennis R. Dams (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
642-05089-3_34. 
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3.2. Corporate law recommendations 
The board’s role and functions differ significantly between civil and common 
law countries, as differences can be noticed also between jurisdictions. For instance, 
depending on the structure of  the board, unitary or dual, the attributed duties and the 
subsequent liability regimes vary between Germany and the Netherlands,57 which the 
follow the dual board structure and countries such as the UK (along with a majority of  
the Member States,)  follow the unitary board structure.58
In the present, the unitary board structure will be followed, as a model of  
corporate governance, and subsequently, when it comes to dual board structure, the 
duties of  the management board will be examined. 
Company law, recognizes the board of  directors as the core body of  an 
organisation, elected by the shareholders, or by the supervisory board,59 and delegated 
to carry out the formal decision-making process related to the company’s business 
affairs.60 This decision-making function of  the directors can be further classified into 
two categories: management, and monitoring.61 The main managerial task of  the board 
is to outline the company’s business strategy and to handle important business issues, 
described in law, such as approving the annual financial statements of  the company, 
appointing the members of  the C-suite, deciding upon the share of  dividends, and 
issuing the company’s corporate governance statement, as well as, deciding upon 
extraordinary issues, such as mergers and acquisitions, related-party transactions, even 
– but not exclusively – the amendment of  the articles of  association.
However, after the famous The Structure of  the Corporation by Professor Melvin 
Eisenberg,62 the monitoring function of  the board has risen to be one of  its principal 
roles, especially after the economic scandals and crises. As a duty, closely related to 
the contemporary corporate governance model, the monitoring function of  the board 
reflects the still predominant agency theory, and thus, it focuses on balancing the 
inherent conflicting interests arising from the separation of  ownership and control, 
and, concomitantly, on avoiding the potential managerial shirking.63  
The abovementioned regulated duties of  the board are complemented by a nexus 
of  standards of  behavior, which the directors should exhibit acting as fiduciaries. In 
particular, the directors when they deal with the company’s affairs, should do so in 
good faith64. The compliance with this standard can be examined ex post by the courts.
Specifically, disregarding  the differences between jurisdictions, the duty of  care, 
as standard of  behaviour is imposed on  the board of  directors, applicable both to 
57 The dual board structure is also followed in Austria and Denmark, while countries as France, allow 
for the companies to choose between the dual or unitary structure. See Cristine A. Mallin, Corporate 
Governance, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 250-276.
58  Ibid.  
59 In Germany, §84 of  Aktiengesetz. 
60 Supra note 26, 2. 
61 Ibid. 3-6, where Bainbridge classifies the function of  the board in three categories “management, 
oversight and service”, where service is provided in the case of  a diverse board, consisting also from 
independent members that can assist the board and the managers of  a company with their expertise 
in sectors such as finance, politics and innovation. 
62 Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Ralph K. Winter and Fred S. McChesney, “The Structure of  Corporation 
Law”, Columbia Law Review, vol. 89 (1989): 1461, https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2007/. 
63 Supra note 26, 39-40. 
64 John Armour, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies”, in 
The Anatomy of  Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier Kraakman, et al., 3d ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 31-33, 37. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739630.003.0002. 
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their management and monitoring responsibilities. The duty of  care can be summed 
up as the duty of  the director to exhibit the diligence that it is reasonably expected 
from a prudent businessman of  his skill and knowledge, in that particular case, when 
managing corporate affairs. In other words, to act as a reasonable entrepreneur. However, 
the cases where the courts recognise a breach of  the duty of  care are rather scarce 
throughout different jurisdictions, since they abstain from qualifying what constitutes 
a reasonable business decision, and thus judge it on its merits.65
Another reason for why there is a dearth of  case law regarding the breach of  duty 
of  care is the business judgment rule, functioning as a safe harbour for the directors. Either 
explicitly stated in law, such as in Germany for the managing directors,66 or through case 
law, as in the UK,67 the Business Judgment rule formats the boundaries of  the duty of  
care that a director should exhibit. Moreover, the Business Judgment Rule accumulates 
the predominant goal of  corporate governance, as it formed through agency theory. 
The short-term proliferation of  the shareholders, mandated by balancing conflicting 
interests within the company, formatted the duty of  the directors. 
Besides the de facto or de jure definition given to the business judgment rule, there 
are significant differences amongst jurisdictions. However, in its essence, the Business 
Judgment Rule acknowledges the risky environment in which the board functions and 
considers the ambiguous outcomes of  the directors’ decisions. Thus, for a director to 
be protected under the business judgment rule, hence, not to be held liable for a breach of  
the duty of  care, he must make a satisfactory decision. For a decision to be satisfactory, 
it must be done in good faith, based on  reasonably sufficient information and to the 
company’s benefit, while the outcome of  the decision, does not affect the liability of  
the director. 
However, when AI is used in the boardroom to make decisions, the level of  
information that, even indirectly, the directors possess is no longer merely sufficient. 
Machine learning AI has the ability to analyse a prodigious amount of  data, if  not all 
the available information, and it reaches its decision based on that. Besides, this is what 
makes the decisions of  the AI optimal. Thus, a powerful tool is given to the directors 
while at the same time, the construction of  the business judgment rule is tested.
In this Section, the possible internal liability of  the augmented board of  directors 
will be examined. Specifically, based on the duties which burden the board of  
directors according to the set company law provisions, possible suitable accountability 
mechanisms will be scrutinised when AI is used in the boardroom. For this purpose, 
the two scenarios, presented in Section 1 will be used. 
65 John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “The Basic Governance 
Structure: The Interests of  Shareholders as a Class”, in The Anatomy of  Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach, ed. Reinier Kraakman, et al., 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 69-71. 
66 § 93 AktG. Similarly, in Italy Art.º 2381 Codice Civile regarding the obligation of  the directors to 
be adequately informed when making a business decision, and Delaware General Corporation Law § 
102(b)(7), where the possibility of  introducing provision in the articles of  association for breaches of  
the duty of  care in good faith is mentioned. 
67 According to Section 1157 of  the Companies Act 2006, the courts, at their discretion, they may not 
hold a director liable in cases where although there was a  breach of  the duty of  care, the directors 
acted “honestly and reasonably” and John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins and Richard Nolan, 
“Private Enforcement of  Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of  the United Kingdom and 
the United States”, Journal of  Empirical Legal Studies, vol. 6, No. 4 (2009): 687-722, doi:10.1111/j.1740-
1461.2009.01157.x, where it is stated that in reality no suits were brought by shareholders against 
directors in the UK. In the UK also rarely, the directors are held liable for wrongful trading, based on 
Section 214 of  the Insolvency Act 1986, when the company is the stage of  insolvent liquidation. 
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First, the scenario where the AI assists the board of  directors by making suggestions 
regarding the management and business strategy of  the company, will be deployed and 
a possible liability scheme will be investigated. At this stage, the suggestion of  the AI is 
taken into account, and it is finalised only after the board has reviewed the lawfulness 
of  the AI’s decision. 
As it was mentioned above, as part of  the directors’ duties, and governed by the 
duty of  care that they should exhibit, directors should at least generally monitor and 
supervise the people to whom they have delegated some powers or functions. Even 
though, only from a broad interpretation, as it will be mentioned in Section 4.1, the 
deployment of  AI in the boardroom can be considered delegation of  decision powers, 
some analogies can be drawn. Moreover, although these supervisory duties of  the 
board are not clearly outlined in company law provisions and they depend heavily on 
the jurisdiction and subsequently on the board structure, it can be generally argued that 
the board has a duty to monitor the decisions made by the AI. 
This monitoring process cannot take place ex ante. As it was discussed in Section 
2, one of  the inherent problems of  AI is the inability of  the user to accurately identify 
the information and the processes based on which the AI made its decision. Thus, the 
directors will not be required to trace back the decision, as this will be difficult, almost 
impossible, and time consuming, hence cancelling the advantages of  using AI in the 
first place. On the contrary, what the directors are capable of  monitoring, based on 
their skill and experience, is whether the decision of  the AI fits the business practices 
and standards and whether it is in compliance with the current regulatory framework.68 
Additionally, a mechanism of  “procedural regularity”, facilitating the lawfulness 
check conducted by the board of  directors has been proposed. 69 As part of  an ex 
ante strategy, since the proposed techniques lie in the realm of  techno-regulation, it has 
been suggested in academia to pre-install in the source code of  the AI a cryptographic 
commitment mechanism to check the lawfulness of  an automatic decision.70 Cryptographic 
commitments are encrypted statements issued by the AI, after making the decision, that 
without stating all the information that were taken into account to form its decision, 
since this would have been impossible due to the complexity of  the deep learning 
neural networks, they can ensure that when making the decision, the set relevant laws 
and regulations encoded in the algorithm were followed. At the same time, since the 
commitment is encrypted, the board alone will hold the decryption key, thus, preventing 
a third party from accessing or altering the commitment. Alterations will also not be 
possible by the board itself, since each commitment will be tied to a specific decision, 
with a certain issuance time and date. Moreover, these commitments, after the board 
has finalised the decision made by the AI, can become public by the company, to 
further ascertain the legitimacy of  the board’s decision. 
Based on the above, in case the directors fail to reasonably check whether the 
decision of  the AI is at first lawful, a breach of  the duty of  care will be recognised. This 
68 Similarly regarding robo-advisors, see Florian Möslein and Arne Lordt, “Rechtsfragen des Robo-
Advice”, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) (2017): 793, 803. 
69 Supra note 50, 665-667. 
70 Cryptographic commitment mechanism is a technique of  “verifying computation procedures” that lead to 
the issuance of  “a digital object that binds the prover to a certain statement without revealing the statement. Later 
… the verifier can use the commitment to check that the statement is in fact the one the prover committed to earlier” in 
Ariel Hamlin, Nabil Schear, Emily Shen, Mayank Varia, Sophia Yakoubov, and Arkady Yerukhimovich 
“Cryptography for Big Data Security”, in Big Data: Storage, Sharing, and Security, ed. Fei Hu (Auerbach 
Publications: 2016), 29. 
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solution points out the fact that directors are still held accountable and they do not 
benefit from the business judgment rule, by claiming ignorance for not acting accordingly 
to their duty of  care, even in cases where a third-party has been delegated to collect and 
review information in a specific case.71  
Furthermore, after examining how the directors’ liability is formed in the first 
hypothesis, the second scenario of  AI’s use in the boardroom and, concomitantly, the 
suitable accountability scheme will be investigated. In the second stage of  AI deployment 
in the decision-making process of  the board, again the AI makes decisions, but the 
board of  directors is bound to follow the suggestion made by the AI unofficially or 
officially based on the articles of  association or on a shareholders’ agreement.
In other words, in light of  the second hypothesis, what is discussed is the 
development of  a new standard of  care. The board of  directors, either directly from 
the articles of  association or indirectly due to business practices or shareholders’ 
agreements will be expected to follow the decision made by the AI. Subsequently, the 
board of  directors can be held accountable for breaching the duty of  care when it does 
not finalise the decision of  the AI. 
At this point, however, what has been said in Section 1 should be restated, when 
presenting the second hypothesis. The board is still in power, and thus, when it is deemed 
necessary, it can deviate from the AI’s decision. However, the degree of  monitoring 
the AI’s decision is looser compared to the first hypothesis. Thus, instead of  checking 
the lawfulness of  the decision, the board should determine whether the decision is fair 
and reasonable. In other words, the board should not finalise the decision made by 
the AI when it is unfair or entirely unreasonable, for instance due to a malfunction. At 
this point, the social skills, the intuitive intelligence, and the creativity of  the board should 
come into play. 
Moreover, the board’s responsibility to make fair decisions is not novel, but as 
it was mentioned above, as a general company law standard, the board of  directors 
should conduct the company’s business in an honest manner and in good faith, in 
the interest of  the business and its shareholders, while being fair towards the relevant 
stakeholders.72 Based on the human-machine collaboration on the decision-making 
process, it is only reasonable for the board of  directors to be responsible for checking 
the morality and fairness of  the AI decisions, since their objective and statistical nature 
cannot integrate humane elements. For instance, in the event that a company needs to 
reduce expenses, the AI may suggest layoffs as a cost-saving option. However lawful, 
this decision might be deemed unfair by the board when an alternative that will be as 
cost-effective as the one proposed by the AI may be available. For example, the board 
may decide that pay-cuts might be preferable, as it will save potential legal costs for 
wrongful termination of  contract and a subsequent hit to the company’s reputation.
Based on the above, even within the realm of  the second stage, the board should 
check the fairness and reasonableness of  the AI’s decision, and if  it is found unfair or 
completely absurd it cannot be followed. However, since in this hypothetical scenario 
finalising the AI’s decision is part of  the director’s duty of  care, to avoid breaching 
71 William E. Knepper, Dan A. Bailey, Stacy R. Lane, Katharine B. Bowman, Michael R. Goodstein 
and Darius N. Kandawalla, Liability of  Corporate Officers and Directors, 8th ed. (New York: LexisNexis, 
2009). 
72 Supra see note 26, 39-40. Based on law’s mandate for fair decisions, the board should take into 
account the conflicting interests and strike a balance between them. Through this procedural fairness 
that can be ascertained through transparency, the decision of  the board will also be fair and although 
to the company’s interest it will be without bias, thus objective and reasonable.
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it a similar to the available in corporate governance comply or explain approach can be 
deployed. 
The comply or explain mechanism, firstly introduced in the Cadbury Report in 1992, 
and as stated in Article 20 of  the Directive 2013/34,73 is a core principle of  corporate 
governance. It allows companies to deviate from the corporate governance codes set 
in place, as long as, they explain in their corporate governance statements the reasons 
for their decision. Based on the idea that one-size does not fit all the companies, the 
legislator has decided to provide this tool to the companies, allowing the market and the 
relevant stakeholders to decide whether this departure from the proposed governance 
model should be applauded or scrutinised. However, as it was stated in the 2014 
Commission’s recommendation, the quality of  the explanations is of  importance.74
Following the requirements set in Section III of  the Commission’s recommendation, 
the board of  directors should explain to the stakeholders in a comprehensive manner 
a) in what way it has decided to depart from the AI’s decision; b) describe the reasons 
for not following the AI’s decision; c) describe how the decision to deviate from the 
decision of  the AI was taken; d) describe the decision followed instead and explain 
how this decision achieves the company’s goals.
By doing so, the directors will have fulfilled their duty of  care, hence, they will 
not be held accountable for not following the decision made by the AI. In practice, 
the abovementioned comply or explain mechanism, might be more relevant when the 
decision made by the AI is unreasonable, for instance due to a malfunction. On the 
contrary, when it comes to decisions made by the AI that are lawful but unfair to 
some stakeholders, the directors’ risk-averse predisposition will probably lead them to 
eventually finalise the decision made by the AI. This, in conjunction with the fact that 
in this scenario, following the decisions made by the AI is part of  the directors’ duty 
of  care, this might, disregarding  the comply or explain scheme, expose them to liability 
lawsuits if  they do not finalise the decision made by the AI. 
Another issue stemming from the fiduciary duties burdening the directors when 
AI is used in the boardroom is how will the duty of  loyalty be judged when the same 
AI is used by more than one company, and in particular, when the same AI is used by 
competitors. 
Specifically, it is possible that the company deploying the AI is not the same as 
the developer. Moreover, as the use of  AI in the decision-making process increases, 
it is reasonable to expect that AI will be offered as a service, similar to intellectual 
property licenses granted for software by the developer. For instance, that will be the 
case with IBM’s boardroom-version of  Watson75. Although it escapes the scope of  
the present, AI intellectual property licenses will prove to be significantly complicated, 
especially when the coding of  the original algorithm and the code developed during 
the training of  the algorithm are done by different entities. However, particularly when 
AI is licensed to a company to facilitate the decision-making process, it is reasonable to 
expect that the developer will either assign the related intellectual property rights on the 
73 Directive 2013/34/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  26 June 2013 on the 
annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of  certain types of  
undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council and 
repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC.
74 2014/208/EU: Commission Recommendation of  9 April 2014 on the quality of  corporate 
governance reporting (‘comply or explain’).
75 Matthew Wall, “Could a big data-crunching machine be your boss one day?”, BBC, October 9, 2014, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-29456257, last visited 31 March 2020.
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AI or it will license the rights, by listing them exhaustively together with an allocation 
of  any liability due to damages caused to third parties by the use of  the AI. Of  course, 
in both scenarios, it can be presumed that the developer will remain liable against the 
company in case there is a problem with the coding of  the algorithm.
Furthermore, the duty of  loyalty, more broadly stated in common law systems,76 
aims to cancel out conflicts of  interest between the board and the company. In civil 
law jurisdictions, usually aspects of  the duty of  loyalty are addressed in company law 
provisions77. Although there is no uniformity in the way the legislator has decided to 
address the duty of  loyalty between different jurisdictions even within the EU, it can 
be summarised as the directors’ duty to act in good faith and to the interests of  the 
company and to abstain from any action that may harm the company or hinder its 
objectives78. Of  course, a duty of  loyalty cannot be attributed to the AI, as it is not a 
legal person, nor it is possible to hold the directors liable for the AI using information 
of  the company to learn and make decisions for a competitor, since it is not possible 
for them to trace back and determine the information which formed the AI’s decision. 
Notwithstanding, to avoid competition law issues, such infringement of  Article 101(1) 
TFEU for exchange of  information between competitors, or securities law issues, 
such as insider dealing,79 techno-regulation measures of  data access limitations should be 
hardcoded in the algorithm to ensure that the AI will not access and use a competitor’s 
information when making a decision. 
In conclusion, the first accountability mechanism proposed can already be set in 
place based on the available technology and the current company law. On the contrary, 
the second proposed liability scheme requires a mass use of  AI in the boardroom, that 
will concomitantly lead to a change in corporate governance and business practices. 
However, since the deployment of  AI in the boardroom is expected to soar soon, 
it is reasonable to assume that first the duty of  care of  the directors will change and 
subsequently, their liability. Finally, regarding problems that may arise in the field of  
competition and securities law, when two competitors have licensed the same AI, techno-
regulation mechanisms can restrict the access of  the AI to the private information of  the 
company and its competitor. 
76 E.g. in the Delaware General Corporation Law in Title 8, Chapter 1, §141 (e), where the general 
fiduciary duty of  the board of  directors is recognized. In the UK, before the Companies Act 2006 it 
was also broadly stated. 
77 E.g. in Germany, a general fiduciary duty is recognized based on which the directors should be loyal 
to the company. As an expression of  the general fiduciary duty of  loyalty, and besides the related-party 
transactions limitations, an expression of  the duty of  loyalty can be found in § 88 AktG regarding the 
duty of  non-competition. In Greece Article 23 regarding non-competition and Article 23(a) regarding 
related-party transactions of  the Law 2190/1920 for the Anonymous Company. In Italy the duty of  
loyalty derives from a general duty of  acting in good faith in contractual obligations based on Articles 
1175 and 1375 of  Codice Civile, while the aspects of  self-dealing and corporate opportunities are 
explicitly regulated in Articles 2391 and 2391(5) of  Codice Civile, respectively. Also, in the UK, after the 
Companies Act 2006, the duty to avoid conflicts of  interest in § 176, duty to not accept benefits from 
third parties in § 177 and the duty to declare interest in proposed transactions or arrangements in § 177 
has been regulated. On the contrary, in the Netherlands, there is no provision regarding the aspects of  
the duty of  loyalty. The courts decide upon cases regarding conflicts of  interest based on a general duty 
of  fairness and reasonableness based on Article 2:8(1) and on a general duty deriving from contractual 
obligations according to Article 2:9(1) of  the Dutch Civil Code. 
78 In this manner in Greece, Article 22(a) of  the Law 2190/1920 for the Anonymous Company.
79 Article 3 eq. Directive 2014/57/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 April 
2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive or “MAD”). 
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3.3. Securities law recommendations
The regime of  external liability of  the board of  directors is very limited. In 
particular, external liability is recognized only by securities law. However, the differences 
between EU and US are crucial to determine in which cases the board will be held 
liable against the investors. 
In general, securities law aims in facilitating the transparency in the market by 
increasing the amount of  information available. According to the efficient market hypothesis, 
originating in the US, but also present in the regulator’s choices in the EU, when there is 
sufficient information in the market, the market price of  the shares of  a publicly traded 
company will be able to reflect this information. Thus, securities law, both in US and 
EU, through disclosure of  material information regarding the company, mandatory or 
voluntarily, in the primary and secondary market, aims to assure “informationally efficient” 
stock prices, on which the investors can rely on 80.
Besides the financial statements and the detailed information regarding the issuer 
and its shares in the prospectus, which follows the issuance of  new securities, both 
in the US81 and in the EU,82 the disclosure of  other relevant information, such as 
the management’s report on future company’s strategies and possible uncertainties, is 
encouraged. This information further enables the investor to estimate possible changes 
in the cash flow of  the issuer-company83. 
Although the abovementioned type of  information is “softer”, when the board is 
making its report, it must do so in good faith. In other words, if  the predictions and 
plans discussed were not made in a reasonable manner; in good faith, on the basis of  
reasonably sufficient information and to the company’s benefit, 84 the board of  directors 
will be held liable, jointly and severally with the issuer-company85. This accountability 
mechanism reflects the need for transparency and information accuracy in the market, 
as seen in the US-developed fraud on the market theory, as a negative reflection of  the 
efficient market hypothesis. According to the fraud on the market theory,86 it is reasonable to 
assume that the investor-plaintiff  relied on the flawed information available to make 
80 Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, “The Mechanisms of  Market Efficiency”, Virginia Law 
Review, vol 70 (1984): 549, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/895/.
81 Regulation S- K, Item 303, Management Discussion and Analysis of  Financial Condition and Results of  
Operations (MD&A).
82 Articles 4(2)(c) and 5(4) of  Directive 2013/50/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council of  22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of  the European Parliament and 
of  the Council on the harmonization of  transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of  
the European Parliament and of  the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of  certain provisions of  Directive 2004/109/EC Text with 
EEA relevance (Transparency Directive) that ask from publicly traded companies to disclose “principal 
risks and uncertainties that they face” on a six-months and annual basis.
83 Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman and Edward Rock, “Corporate Law and Securities 
Markets”, in The Anatomy of  Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier Kraakman, 
et al., 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 250-252. 
84  CFR § 230 Rule 175 of  the Securities Act 1933. 
85 In the EU, Article 1 of  the Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of  the European Parliament and of  
the Council of  16 April 2014 on market abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and repealing Directive 
2003/6/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/
EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, and in the US 17 C.F.R. § 240. Rule 10b- 5 for securities fraud. 
86 Judgment Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 United States Reports 224 (1988), and recently restated in 
judgment Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund Inc., 134 Supreme Court Reporter 2398 (2014). 
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his investment decision. This legal presumption enables in the US, contrary to EU, 
securities fraud class actions.87
Notwithstanding, both in the US and in Europe, that even when the directors 
are held liable, it has been noted that in practice, directors do not compensate the 
investors personally.88 On the contrary, when it comes to securities fraud, the damages 
are covered by Directors’ and Officers’ insurances (D&O insurance), set in place by the 
company. Although highly debatable as a business practice,89 one of  the justifications 
proposed, besides market liquidity and market sanctions through reputational damages 
imposed to the directors,90 is that in any case, the issuer benefitted from possible 
inflated prices created by the directors’ false statements, making it reasonable for the 
company to cover the damage.91
In the light of  the above, in the present Section the liability of  the board of  
directors based on securities law will be examined, when a fraudulent statement, in 
particular, a fraudulent director’s report, based on the AI’s analysis was included in the 
prospectus.
The ability of  the AI to analyze a colossal  amount of  data and subsequently make 
statistical based decisions, as has been stated throughout the present, will be a useful 
tool for the decision-making process of  the board. However, the possibility of  an AI 
making a false decision remains possible. For this purpose, a distinction should be 
made when the fraudulent statement, and the concomitant damages to the investors, 
were caused due to a malfunction of  the AI or not. 
In the first scenario, three possible answers arise as to who will be held liable; 
a) the board members, b) the issuer company, or c) the developer of  the AI, when 
he is different from the issuer. Of  course, the possibility of  the AI to be liable is not 
taken into account, since the AI is not recognized by law as a carrier of  rights and 
responsibilities, hence, it does not profit, and, furthermore, the subjective element of  
scienter cannot be attributed to it. 
Based on the above, regarding the possibility of  the board members to continue 
being liable, a scheme similar to the one proposed in the Section 3.2, regarding the 
internal liability of  the directors should be made. If  the board, when generally checking 
the decision made by the AI, finalised the decision in good faith and reasonably 
presuming that this was a correct prediction for the company, it should not be held 
liable. This safe harbour is in compliance with the business judgment rule and similar to the 
exemption recognized in the US in Rule 175 of  the Securities Act 1933.92
Furthermore, regarding the third possibility, the answer should be negative. As 
it was mentioned, when there is an assignment or licensing of  the AI, there will be an 
allocation of  risk from the developer to the company-user regarding the liability of  
87 Supra note 81, 260, with further references regarding the number of  securities fraud class actions 
filed in the US. 
88 For the US see supra, note 81, 261-262. For the EU see Martin Gelter, “Risk-shifting Through 
Issuer Liability and Corporate Monitoring”, European Business Organisation Law Review, vol. 14 (2013): 
497–533, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752912001280. 
89 William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, “The Political Economy of  Fraud on the Market”, 
University of  Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 160 (2011), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_
scholarship/1192. 
90 Supra note 81, 261. 
91 James C. Spindler, “Vicarious Liability for Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong About Rule 
10b- 5?”, American Law and Economics Review, vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 2011): 359-401, https://www.jstor.
org/stable/42705598. 
92 Supra note 81. 
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the first for damages caused to third parties. Moreover, the antifraud provisions, both 
in the US and in the EU, refer to a numerus clausus of  people that can be held liable, 
generally, the ones signing the prospectus. Opening the list and enabling investors to 
turn against the AI-developers will prove to be counter-effective, as it will require  the 
investors to identify the developer of  the AI, prove the malfunction and its causality 
link to the damages they suffered. Moreover, it will open the Pandora’s Box for AI-
developers and will expose them to unnecessary risk, while it will enable companies 
that manipulate the market to escape from the current accountability mechanisms, by 
using AI and claiming its malfunction. 
A solution to the abovementioned problem can be given by the second alternative, 
according to which the company should be held accountable. The issuer is also the 
user and possibly the owner of  the AI, either because it has developed the algorithm, 
or commissioned its development, or because it has acquired the license of  using it. 
In any case, based on the issuer’s data that the AI was trained on, the issuer is the 
one benefitting from the AI’s decisions. Moreover, the issuer, based on the set laws, 
is already liable for any manipulation of  the market, since it is benefitting from the 
inflated prices. Additionally, as it was stated in Section 3.1, as part of  the proposed 
corporate governance transparency mechanism, the company deploying the AI should 
set risk-averse mechanisms that will further ensure that the AI can function properly. 
Concomitantly, it is reasonable to argue that the issuer should be held liable and 
not the developer of  the AI or the board of  directors, provided that they reasonably 
trusted the correctness of  the AI’s decision.  In other words, the reason why this 
accountability scheme is preferable, comes as an Occam’s razor, since it maintains the 
causality link established by securities law between the issuer and the investor and it 
enables the remuneration of  the investor by the company, instead of  suggesting that 
the investor should claim the possible damages from the AI-developer. Furthermore, 
it acknowledges the inherent risk-averse business practices of  the board which will 
subsequently lead them to follow the predictions made by the AI, as well as, the board’s 
inability to fully test whether the decision is correct or wrong due to malfunction.
The abovementioned basis does exclude, in the event of  damages caused due to 
poor programming, some sort of  liability to burden the developer. However, although 
this escapes the scope of  the present, it can be argued that developer’s liability can be 
dealt with, first ex ante by developing ethics guidelines and safety-engineering practices 
for AI, and ex post based on the contractual relationships between the owner-company 
and the manufacturer. 
Finally, the allocation of  risk from the board of  directors to the company 
proposed is not novel. As it was mentioned above, D & O insurances are heavily used 
in practice, making the issuer and its shareholders,  accumulate the risk and cover the 
damages caused by the directors.93
After examining the possible accountability scheme when a securities fraud takes 
place due to a malfunction of  the AI, the potential liability regime will be examined in 
the simpler scenario when the prediction of  the AI, incorporated in the report of  the 
directors and subsequently in the issuer’s prospectus, is merely false, possible due to 
wrong or unlawful inputs. 
In this scenario, again as it was mentioned above, the board should not be held 
liable, if  it proves that after reviewing the decision made by the AI, reasonably and 
93  John C. Coffee Jr., “Reforming the Securities Class Action: On Deterrence and Its Implementation”, 
Colum. Law. Review, vol. 106 (2006), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/33. 
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in good faith believed that it was a correct and lawful prediction. Moreover, in the 
second scenario, there is no need to examine the possibility of  the AI developer being 
accountable, since he cannot control the input after developing the algorithm. Thus, 
only the issuer’s liability remains. 
The answer pointing towards the issuer’s liability is easier in this case. Although 
the fraudulent statement was produced by the AI, it was made for the issuer and it was 
included in its prospectus. Thus, the issuer should be held liable for securities fraud, 
also in this hypothesis. 
In conclusion, the liability of  the issuer, either generated by a malfunction of  
the AI or merely due to a false statement produced by it, can be covered in a similar 
manner as the one currently followed for the liability of  the directors. Specifically, 
it is advised for the company deploying the AI in the boardroom, to be insured for 
potential liabilities caused by the AI’s decisions. As it was mentioned throughout the 
present, AI should be considered a tool used by the company and its board to facilitate 
the decision-making process. Thus, the company as the user of  the AI should be held 
accountable for any malfunction or discrepancy of  the system. 
4. Robo-directors
In this Section, we will discuss briefly the legal issues arising in the third stage 
of  AI involvement in the business decision-making process. Specifically, whether the 
current corporate law framework allows for an AI to autonomously run a company 
without human involvement will be examined.
4.1. The personhood problem 
Company law, disregarding of  the differences between jurisdictions, recognises 
the board of  directors as the core body of  an organisation, elected by the shareholders 
and delegated to carry out the formal decision-making process related to the company’s 
business or affairs.94 The board has the authority to frame the company’s policy, to 
manage and monitor the company’s business. The importance of  the board’s decisions 
is highlighted by provisions within company law, giving power to the board to authorise 
and decide upon extraordinary situations, such as mergers and acquisitions, related-
party transactions, and even – but-not exclusively – the amendment of  the articles of  
association. 
Although there are significant differences between jurisdictions, in general, 
there are more extended and uniform provisions, in civil and common law countries 
alike, regarding the board’s role and liability. On the contrary, there is no uniformity 
regarding the board’s composition, the duration of  its term and the board member’s 
qualifications.95 Specifically, regarding the composition of  the board and depending 
on the board structure, unitary or dual, requirements are established only to ensure 
the independence and impartiality of  the board. In Germany and the Netherlands, 
where the dual structure is predominant, as part of  the clear distinction between the 
functions of  the supervisory and the management board, members of  one board 
cannot be appointed to the other. In particular, no more than two previous members 
of  the management board can be appointed later on the supervisory board. Similar 
94 E.g. the Delaware General Corporation Law in Title 8, Chapter 1, §141 (a) states that “The business 
and affairs of  every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of  a board 
of  directors”.
95 Supra note 26. 
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requirements regarding the independence of  the board also exist in unitary board 
structures, either as a general clause or as an exhaustive list of  criteria, as, for instance, 
in the Commission’s Green Paper about Corporate Governance.96
Nonetheless, if  a general condition can be pinpointed regarding the composition 
of  the board, in both unitary and dual board structures, that is the requirement for 
someone to be a natural person to be appointed in the board. The requirement applies 
both for the appointment as a member and as a representative of  a legal person-
director.97 The importance of  a natural person being appointed in the board can be seen, 
for instance, in the UK Companies Act 2006, where it explicitly states that at least one 
natural person should be appointed on the board of  a company.98 Similarly, in § 6 (2) of  
German Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (hereinafter, 
“GmbHG”) and § 76 (3) of  the Aktiengesetz (hereinafter “AktG”) only natural persons 
are allowed to act as directors.99 Concomitantly, the natural person appointed, although 
not stated in company law provisions, should have the legal capacity to make decisions 
and conduct their business affairs.100
The concept of  natural person was first introduced in Roman law; persona. 
Etymologically, it derives from the word “prosopon” in Ancient Greek, meaning the face 
or mask used in Greek theatre. Based on the latter meaning, in Roman Law persona was 
not a synonym of  human – homo. On the contrary, it was used to describe one of  the 
many possible legal statuses – persons – that a Roman could have be identified as; unus 
homo sustinet plures personas. For instance, a Roman could have been for the law a mere 
citizen or pater familias, when his rights and responsibilities towards the family and the 
community were assessed.101 Contemporary legislation, in different jurisdictions, uses 
the term natural person to distinguish human individuals from personae fictae.102 For that 
purpose, usually the first Chapter of  various Civil Codes is titled “Natural Person”.103 
However, the provisions encapsulated in the Chapters do not give a definition of  the 
natural person. On the contrary, the concept of  the natural person in law has a technical 
96 The EU Corporate Governance Framework, Apr. 5, 2011, COM (2011) Article 13.1 in conjunction 
with Annex II of  the E.U. Commission Recommendation of  February 15, 2005 on the role non-
executive or supervisory directors of  listed companies and on the committees the (supervisory) 
board, O.J.E.U. L 52/51 of  February 2, 2005. 
97 For instance, in the Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 142(a) and in California Corporations 
Code Section 312(a) the term persons is used in general. In these states, an officer-representative of  the 
company director can be appointed at least as an officer of  the company. 
98 Companies Act 2006, Part 10, Charter 1, §155, titled “Companies required to have at least one director who 
is a natural person”, which stated that “(1) A company must have at least one director who is a natural person. (2) 
This requirement is met if  the office of  director is held by a natural person as a corporation sole or otherwise by virtue 
of  an office”.
99 On the contrary, in Lichtenstein it is possible for a legal person to be appointed in the board. See 
supra note 16. 
100 E.g. In Greece Chapter 5 of  the Civil Code titled Legal Transactions, in Germany Division 3 “Legal 
Transactions” Title 1 “Capacity to Contract” of  the Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB).
101 Bartosz Brożek, “The Troublesome ‘Person’ in Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence 
and the Unborn”, Law and Philosophy Library, Vol. 119, ed. Visa A. J. Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski 
(Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 4, 10.1007/978-3-319-53462-6, and Adolf  
Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of  Roman Law (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd, 2004), 377.
102 E.g. Book 2 of  the Dutch Civil Code titled “Legal Persons”, Book 1, Division 1, Title 2 of  the 
Bundesgesetzblatt, titled “Legal Persons”, and Chapter 4 of  the Greek Civil Code, titled “Legal Persons”.
103 E.g. Book 1 of  the Dutch Civil Code titled “Natural Persons & Family Law”, the Book 1, Division 1, 
Title 1 of  the Bundesgesetzblatt, titled “Natural persons, consumers, entrepreneurs”, and Chapter 3 of  the 
Greek Civil Code, titled “Natural Persons”. 
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function and connects the individual human being with certain rights and obligations 
while remaining detached from any philosophical correlations to what a human or a 
person is. 
Furthermore, law may attribute certain descriptive or axiomatic qualities to the 
person. The main aspect of  those legal fictitious concepts developed that attributes 
certain trades to the person is the reasonable man, as it evolved from the Roman pater 
familias. The reasonable man recognises a cluster of  cognitive abilities to the individual 
which qualify him as reasonable and they derive from his general capability from 
being appropriately informed and aware of  the social constructions.104 These general 
attributed qualities may be further specified, depending on the provision or the field 
of  law. Thus, besides the obstacles arising due to the lack of  personhood, the law sets 
further requirements, closely linked to a human individual. For instance, as a fundamental 
principle, company law demands from the board of  directors to conduct the company’s 
business in good faith.105 However, honesty, loyalty and good faith cannot be attributed 
to the utter logical and statistical decisions taken by the AI. Moreover, regarding those 
special cognitive abilities, company law asks from the directors of  a company, when 
making a decision, to act as a reasonable entrepreneur. As a specific manifestation of  the 
general standard of  the reasonable man, a director should prove that he has exhibited 
the diligence that it is reasonably expected from a prudent businessman of  his skill 
and knowledge, in that particular case, when managing corporate affairs.106 Besides 
these objective standards, before the reform of  2006, in the UK, also subjective criteria 
regarding the particular director’s skill and knowledge and experience were taken into 
account when examining the duty of  care and the competence demonstrated by the 
director.107 In other words, although in some jurisdictions the requirement of  a natural 
person being appointed in the board of  directors is not explicitly stated, within the roots 
of  company law, and in particular, regarding director’s duty of  care, human qualities 
are embedded. 
In the light of  the above, in principle, an AI cannot be appointed as a company 
director. Of  course, when the legislator was stating that a natural person should be 
appointed in the board of  directors it was not taking into consideration the possibility 
of  a legal person and much less of  an AI being appointed in the boardroom. Moreover, 
even in jurisdictions such as the UK, where the requirement of  a director being a 
natural person is more loosely stated, since the law merely mandates at least one of  
the members to be a natural person, the objective of  the legislator was not, of  course, 
to exclude an AI from entering the boardroom. On the contrary, the aim was to 
exclude corporate directors from monopolising the board seats, creating uncertainty.108 
However, the choice of  the legislator has been scrutinised.109 Notwithstanding the lack 
104 Wendy Parker, “The Reasonable Person: A Gendered Concept?”, Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev., 
vol. 23 (1993): 105,112, and Manuel Monteiro Resende Protásio, The Reasonable Man in the 21st Century 
Cognitive Experiences Under the Influence of  Technologies & Legal Concepts (Master’s thesis, Tilburg University, 
2018), 9-13.
105 See for US corporate law Melvin A. Eisenberg M, “The Duty of  Good Faith in Corporate Law”, 
Delaware Journal of  Corporate Law, vol. 31, No. 1 (2005): 1-75, https://ssrn.com/abstract=899212.
106 E.g. In UK, Chapter 2 § 174(1), (2) of  the Companies Act 2006 and in Greece, Articles 69 of  the 
Greek Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 22a of  Law 2190/1920 on Anonymous Companies.
107 Paul L. Davies and Klaus J. Hopt, “Boards in Europe – Accountability and Convergence”, American 
Journal of  Comparative Law, vol. 61 (2013): 301-375, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212272. 
108 Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom”, William & Mary Law 
Review Online, vol. 59 (2018), Art.º 3, https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/3, 65. 
109 Stephen M. Bainbridge and Todd M. Henderson, “Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
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of  personhood objects the lawful appointment of  an AI, and much more its ability to 
vote, since it cannot be a carrier of  rights and obligations, it does not have legal capacity, 
and, subsequently, it cannot be held liable. Additionally, the qualities of  the board of  
directors, deriving from the duty of  care, would have to be interpreted broadly to fit 
AI-based decisions. 
Therefore, it will be proved impossible, based on current company law, for 
the board of  directors to legally delegate some decisions to the AI; meaning in the 
manner of  delegating certain tasks to third-parties that act in the name of, and for the 
directors. Although in some jurisdictions the law requires for the delegation of  some 
of  the directors’ powers to a third party to be explicitly mentioned in the articles of  
association,110 provided that it does not fall in the core managerial duties of  the board,111 
a general requirement, not explicitly stated can be identified. The representative should 
be a person, meaning a natural person that acts individually or collectively with other 
representatives. However, a teleological interpretation based on the rationale behind 
the delegation of  powers of  the board; to ensure better organisation and function of  
the board, has been proposed to encompass the delegation of  decision powers to the 
AI.112 
Furthermore, the reluctance of  the law to grant some sort of  legal status to 
the AI, can be drawn from the example of  US law, regarding computers. Although a 
circular argument, the US law does not recognise the possibility of  a computer system 
to act as an agent due to its lack of  personhood.113
That notwithstanding, law, even with a certain delay, tends to adapt to new societal 
needs. As with personae fictae, law has recognizsd limited rights and responsibilities to 
entities other than natural persons, which do not possess human intelligence and their 
own will. Historically, deriving from an economic and societal need to separate an 
organisation from its members, law recognised, almost in a heuristic manner, the 
separate artificial legal personality of  corporations and attributed to them a bundle 
of  rights, previously only held by natural persons. This acknowledgement allowed 
corporations to enter into contracts, own property, sue and be sued.114 Furthermore, 
when the economic and business realities change, law tends to follow a more pragmatic 
approach. For instance, in the seminal case of  Salomon v. Salomon in the UK,115 the 
House of  Lords, overruled the decision by the Court of  Appeal, and recognised legal 
personality of  a one-person company, although before it was not considered possible 
under the Companies Act of  1862.116
Boards”, University of  Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 646; UCLA 
School of  Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 13-11, 2013, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2291065. 
110 E.g. in Greece Article 22 of  the Law 2190/1920 for the Anonymous Company and in Italy Art.º 
2381 para. 2 of  the Codice Civile.  
111 In the US see judgment Re Bally’s Grand Derivative Litigation, Del.J.Corp.L.,Vol 23:677, (Del. Ch. June 
4, 1997),  686.  
112 Supra note 16.
113 Restatement (Third) Of  Agency § 1.04 Cmt. E (2006) where it is stated that a “computer program is not capable 
of  acting as a principal or an agent as defined by the common law. At present, computer programs are instrumentalities of  the 
persons who use them. If  a program malfunctions even in ways unanticipated by its designer or user, the legal consequences for the 
person who uses it are no different than the consequences stemming from the malfunction of  any other type of  instrumentality”. 
114 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Mariana Pargendler, “What is Corporate 
Law”, in The Anatomy of  Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier Kraakman, 
et al., 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5-8. 
115 Judgment Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).
116 Regarding the case, with further footnotes, see Harris Ron, “The Transplantation of  the Legal 
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Whether law is willing to adapt in the future, provided that the use of  AI will 
increase and will lead to profound changes in  business and societal standards, and 
accord  a legal status to AI, remains to be seen. Worthy of  note however, is the European 
Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics, in 2017. A suggestion was made for considering the granting of  an electronic 
personality to robots “when they make smart autonomous decisions or interact with third parties 
independently”.117 This suggestion was widely scrutinised as a superficial understanding 
of  the technology itself, since it only mentioned robots – the embodiment of  AI and 
not smart algorithms and secondly, for being inappropriate, since the term personality 
was used to attribute legal status to robots.118 As  was stated in the UNESCO’s Report 
Of  COMEST On Robotics Ethics in 2017, the term ‘person’ cannot be used for non-
human agents, since they do not possess human qualities “freedom of  will, intentionality, 
self-consciousness, moral agency or a sense of  personal identity”.119
Furthermore, besides the aforementioned arguments, the recommendation 
regarding the acknowledgement of  an electronic personality could have not been 
implemented by the Commission itself.  The power of  determining a person, natural or 
legal, as well as the concomitant attributed rights and obligation lies with the national 
law of  the Member States. It is only after this stage, for instance, that the EU citizenship 
for natural persons,120 and the freedom of  establishment within the Single Market for 
legal persons applies.121 
These concerns were taken into account by the Commission in its announcement, 
released in April 2018, where it outlined the main goals of  the Commission regarding 
AI.122 The establishment of  a legal personality was not mentioned. More recently, in 
February 2020, the Commission published a White Paper, mapping the EU’s approach 
to foster the European ecosystem of  excellence and trust in AI,123 and accompanied by 
the Report on Safety and Liability Aspects of  AI,124 examining the applicability of  the 
Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism 
and American Big Business”, Washington and Lee Law Review, vol. 63, No. 4 (2007): 40-41, https://
ssrn.com/abstract=981888, and regarding the importance of  the case Paul Davies, “Introduction To 
Company Law”, in Gower: Principles of  Modern Company Law, ed. Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington, 
10th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 28. 
117 Paragraph 59(f) of  European Parliament resolution of  16 February 2017 with recommendations 
to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), available at: http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-
0051+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#BKMD-12. 
118 Among others, an open letter towards the Commission, signed by AI, robotics, law, health and 
ethics experts against the recommendation was published on 12 April 2017, available at: http://www.
robotics-openletter.eu/. 
119 UNESCO’s Report Of  COMEST On Robotics Ethics, SHS/YES/COMEST-10/17/2 REV, 
Paris, 14 September 2017, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002539/253952E.pdf. 
120 Article 20 TFEU. 
121 Article 49 et seq. TFEU. 
122 European Commission - Press release on 9 March 2018. Artificial intelligence: Commission kicks 
off  work on marrying cutting-edge technology and ethical standards, available at: http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1381_en.htm, and European Commission - Press Release on 25 April 
2018, Artificial Intelligence: Commission Outlines A European Approach To Boost Investment And 
Set Ethical Guidelines, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3362_en.htm. 
123 European Commission, White Paper: White Paper on Artificial Intelligence: a European approach 
to excellence and trust, 19 February 2020, COM(2020) 65 final, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publica-
tions/white-paper-artificial-intelligence-european-approach-excellence-and-trust_en. 
124 Supra, note 13. 
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Product Liability Directive,125 as well as AI ethics guidelines.126 Although more present 
nowadays due to the advancement of  the technology and the legal concerns regarding 
liability, the discussion around the possibility of  acknowledging a legal status to AI is 
not novel. 
In 1992, Professor Lawrence B. Solum, examined in his essay Legal Personhood for 
Artificial Intelligences, whether personhood could be granted to AI , and more precisely, 
whether rights should be granted to the AI.127 Of  course, the theoretical exercise of  
Professor Solum was about highly intelligent – human-like AIs, fitting the description 
of  Artificial General Intelligence (hereinafter “AGI”). According to AI scientists and 
futurists, AGI will have the ability to achieve general complex goals, like humans. 
Besides being the prime focus of  the computer scientists in the 50s, and even described 
by Alan Turing before that, still the technology is very far from achieving an AGI-level 
or Singularity ;the development of  an Artificial Superintelligence, which will surpass our 
limited but various human skills. Although Professor Solum does not reach a definite 
answer and he concludes that there are strong objections in recognizing some sort of  
legal personhood to super-intelligent agents, an affinity can be identified; regulators 
and academics can more easily visualise granting certain rights and legal to human-like 
AIs.128
However, before answering whether AI can be granted some sort of  personhood 
or legal status, the legislators should try to identify how the already existing technology 
affects business, the economy, and thus, the law.   
4.2. AI-managed companies
In the field of  company law, discussion in academia has risen regarding the 
possibility of  an AI managing and, perhaps, owning a company. 
According to the academic literature, the legal personality granted by law to 
a numerus clausus of  organisations may provide an interface for the AI and a way to 
bypass the political and philosophical hardships of  granting personhood to AI, and 
subsequently the problem of  whether AI can be appointed in the boardroom.129 
Specifically, it has been proposed that in the event that the legislator decides not to take 
any action regarding the legal status of  the AI, the possibility of  a legal vacuum can be 
avoided by founding an organization which concomitantly will become memberless - 
without natural or legal persons as members –, allowing the AI to solely manage it.130 
This proposal is tested by examining whether certain types of  organisations can 
allow an AI to practically control and manage the company, without the interference 
of  the founders of  the company and its subsequent shareholders. Namely, the possible 
existence of  a memberless GmbH in Germany, a Limited Liability Partnership 
125 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of  25 July 1985 on the approximation of  the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of  the Member States concerning liability for defective products.
126 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, 8 April 
2019, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai. 
127 Supra note 12, p. 1255. Where he presents objections regarding the moral nature of  rights and 
obligations, the humane elements of  personhood, such as consciousness and intentionality, and finally 
that a human creation-property cannot acquire legal status. 
128 For an overview of  the literature regarding the matter, see Bert-Jaap Koops, Mireille Hildebrandt 
and David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, “Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the 
Information Society?”, Minnesota Journal of  Law, Science & Technology, vol. 11, No. 2 (2010): 516-547, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1647744. 
129 Supra note 15. 
130 Ibid , 96. 
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(hereinafter “LLP”) in the UK, and a Limited Liability Company (hereinafter “LLC”) 
in the US, has been examined, only to agree that based on the set company law 
requirements, these companies cannot exist indefinitely without members.131
Furthermore, this theoretical exercise continues by examining whether the AI will 
be able through the legal person of  the company to execute enforceable legal actions 
autonomously, after it has been founded by a natural or legal person .132 However, this 
will not be possible in the case of  the GmbH. As it was mentioned in Section 3.2, a 
GmbH requires natural persons to act as directors. From that perspective, the board 
will always have to have a natural person acting as a director, regardless of  whether this 
director will follow the decisions of  the AI. 
Moreover, in the UK, contrary to the requirement set out in the Companies Act 
2006 regarding private and public companies, where at least one natural person needs to 
be appointed in the board, the more flexible LLP, due to its partnership nature, allows 
its members to form the LLP’s governance structure based on their membership 
agreement.133 Based on this agreement, which is not subject to specific publicity 
requirements, and the autonomy granted to the members of  the LLP, the members 
can agree upon adopting the decisions made by the AI, as the LLP’s decisions. A 
similar possibility can be granted by an operating agreement between the members of  
the LLC in the US.
Although the abovementioned examples fail to demonstrate how an AI can 
manage a company without human interference, they prove, first, that smaller and 
more flexible types of  organization can tie the management of  the company to the 
decisions made by the AI. Secondly, that the will and contractual freedom of  the 
shareholders or the members of  the organisation may be the way of  bypassing the 
requirement set in company law that requires the directors to be appointed to be natural 
persons, either as members or representatives of  a legal person. For instance, as the 
AI technology advances, and concomitantly, as its use in the decision-making process 
increases, in theory, the shareholders could either include in the articles of  association 
or in a shareholders’ agreement an obligation for the directors to deploy and follow the 
decisions made by the AI.134 
Notwithstanding, although the academics examining the abovementioned 
possibility they are doing so with the goal of  granting some sort of  legal status, or at 
least, a sense of  legality to the autonomous actions of  the AI, it is of  greater importance 
to see whether autonomous actions of  the AI can be enforceable. 
For this question, the following scenario can be considered. A company has given 
a certain fund to the AI to manage and decide its distribution. The AI, after analysing 
the market trends and consumer preferences, decides upon the next R&D project of  
131 Supra note 15, p. 122.
132 Supra note 127, 112, where Bayern calls this arbitrary legal status given indirectly to the AI as a “de-
facto private-law personhood”.
133 Limited Liability Partnerships Act, c. 12, § 5(1) and supra note 11, p. 13. 
134 For instance, in Germany and Italy, the shareholders can deviate from the articles of  association 
in the shareholders’ agreement, but they cannot deviate from mandatory provisions or provisions of  
public policy. Similarly, in the Netherlands when it comes to the standard requirements of  the bylaws set 
by company law. In the UK more freedom is granted, allowing the shareholders to dictate the way that 
the director, exercising his duty for independent judgment, makes decisions.  Similarly, in the US, with 
the limitation of  not alleviating a director from his duties. For a comparative analysis, see IBA Guide 
on Shareholders’ Agreements, available at: https://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Corporate_Law_Section/
Clsly_Held_Growing_Busi_Entprs/shareholderagreements.aspx. 
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the company. Subsequently, the AI selects the best supplier for the material needed, 
hence, creating and executing contracts by releasing and distributing funds of  the 
company. 
Based on the abovementioned simplified example, the AI acts as a tool, especially 
delegated by the company to fulfill certain tasks that, for convenience, are automatically 
executed. However, whether this contract is legally binding for the company and the 
supplier should be examined.
According to Article 12, in conjunction with Article 8, of  the United Nations 
Convention on the Use of  Electronic Communications in International Contracts,135 a contract 
concluded after the interaction of  an automated system and a natural person or between 
automated systems, without human intervention,136 is a valid and enforceable, based 
on the functional equivalent approach.137 Moreover, any actions and contracts concluded 
automatically by electronic means are attributed to the person who programmed and 
initiated them,138 since the computer system is merely a tool.139
The above laws, in fact, they refer to automatic transactions and not to autonomous 
ones, performed by an AI. However, as a rule of  thumb, the same reasoning can be 
followed when AI is used by a natural or legal person to enter in and perform valid and 
enforceable contracts that will legally bind its user. Notwithstanding, for the already 
existing laws to apply to AI-transactions, a broader understanding of  the term of  
electronic agent or information systems might be needed.140
In conclusion, the potential recognition of  the enforceability of  autonomous 
actions, and whether they fit in the current regulatory framework regarding autonomous 
transactions, should be considered by the legislator, along with the possibility of  some 
limited form of  legal agency being attributed to AI.141 As the human-machine synergy 
is expected to increase in the future, the regulator should take a position to avoid 
scenarios where the technology will be used for companies and individuals to abuse or 
circumvent the law and its accountability mechanisms. Nonetheless, the above proposed 
approach might not be fitting in the future for cetain types of  AI, whose actions cannot 
be traced back to a human individual. However, such intelligent machines do not yet 
exist. 
135 Adopted on 23 November 2005 and enter into force on 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention.html. 
136 Article 4(g) of  the UN Convention and Article 2(c) of  the UNCITRAL Enactment of  the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce of  1996, as it stands today with additional article 
5 bis as adopted in 1998, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_
commerce/1996Model.html.
137 Paragraph 16 of  the Enactment of  the Model Law. Similarly, 15 UCS § 7001 of  the Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act 2000 (E-Sign) in US. 
138 Article 13(2) (b) of  the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. 
139 Paragraph 35 of  the Enactment of  the Model Law. Explicitly stated in notes in the Comment 5 
“Electronic Agent” of  Section 2 of  the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) in the US. 
140 See ibid Comment 5 of  UETA, where it is stated, with a reference to Tom Allen” and Robin 
Widdison, “Can Computers Make Contracts?.”, Harvard. Journal of  Law & Technology, vol. 9, No. I 
(Winter, 1996): 26-52, that “within the useful life of  this Act, electronic agents may be created with the ability to 
act autonomously, and not just automatically. That is, through developments in artificial intelligence, a computer may 
be able to “learn through experience, modify the instructions in their own programs, and even devise new instructions.” 
If  such developments occur, courts may construe the definition of  electronic agent accordingly, in order to recognize such 
new capabilities”.
141 Samir Chopra and Laurence White, “Artificial Agents and the Contracting Problem: A Solution 
Via an Agency Analysis”, University of  Illinois Journal of  Law Technology & Policy, (2009): 363, https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1589564. 
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5. Conclusion 
AI, in the years to come, will become an essential part of  the managerial and 
strategic judgments made by the board of  directors, since it will provide the board with 
a fuller, timely and more objective insight.
However, the current legal standards and liability mechanisms available in the 
field of  company and securities law, and corporate governance were drafted with 
human decisions in mind, making them, at first, estrange to an enhanced decision-
making process facilitated by AI. Moreover, these accountability regimes are even less 
suitable when unfair or false decisions are made by the AI, and they are concomitantly 
followed by the board.  
Corporate governance is a suitable instrument for an ex ante regulation of  smart 
companies; companies that have augmented their board’s decision-making process by 
using AI. By adapting the transparency principle, running throughout the corporate 
governance system, this will ensure that the companies deploying AI have efficiently 
informed the public about the use of  the technology and the goals of  the AI, while 
protecting the source code, security and compliance with the current regulatory 
framework can be ensured. At the same time, from a techno-regulation perspective, 
fundamental legal principles, such as the protection of  data privacy, along with the 
relevant commercial law provisions, should be embedded in the algorithms original 
code. In that way, also the means by which the AI will achieve its set goals will be 
specific, limited, and lawful, and on the other hand, phenomena where the abilities of  
machine learning are used by a company to bypass the set laws can be avoided.   
However, the main problem that legislators will face in regulating smart companies 
is to find a suitable mechanism to align the current company law with the use of  AI, 
in an acceptable manner for all the stakeholders, while not diminishing the advantages 
of  AI nor hindering innovation. For that purpose, a profound understanding, by the 
regulators, of  the technology, its capabilities, limits and inherent problems should be 
ensured. In other words, acknowledging the possibilities provided by the use of  AI in 
the decision-making process of  the board of  directors, as well as, the issues that can 
arise in the field of  company and securities law, the legislator should try to enable and 
support the innovation arriving in this field by embracing a more dynamic regulatory 
framework, while taking into account the interests of  the different stakeholders. 
In this regard, the already existing laws and regulations should be examined to 
test if  and how they can entail AI-facilitated decisions. This approach can silence 
the concerns of  those fearing a strict and obsolete regulatory intervention regarding 
AI while bringing legal certainty. Additionally, a principles-based approach is rather 
suitable for when AI is being used in the boardroom, since the principles and standards 
of  company and securities law, and corporate governance are embedded in the heart 
of  modern Commercial Law.
